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The ambiguous taxation of prostitution: 
The role of fiscal arrangements in hindering the sexual and economic citizenship of sex 
workers 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the understudied and undertheorized role that fiscal policies play in 
shaping the relationship between the state and sex workers. It highlights the importance of 
looking at tax policy and its implementation to understand how inequality is reinforced 
against sexually marginalized populations. Drawing on the Italian case, it explores the ways 
in which ambiguous taxation arrangements operate to penalize sex workers, excluding them 
from the status of full taxpayer citizenship, and demonizing them as individuals who exploit 
the fiscal system at the expense of ‘good’ tax-paying citizens. Fiscal policies, I argue, need to 
be considered in the context of the governance of prostitution as social mechanisms that have 
the potential to contribute to the sexual and economic citizenship of this marginalized 
population, but which, when unequal and ambiguous, reinforce the social and political 
liminality of sex workers as lesser citizens, and add to the stigma, damaging stereotypes and 
violence already waged against them. The complex ways in which inequality against sex 
workers is maintained is revealed as a dynamic process that reflects the ever-shifting 
interplay of economics and morality. 
 
Keywords: Taxation and sex work; citizenship; governance of prostitution; stigma; exclusion; 
economics and morality. 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Prostitution laws play an important role in forging the relationship between the state and sex 
workers. The institutional treatment of prostitution and of those who operate in it in any given 
national jurisdiction, however, is also shaped by a broad array of rarely homogenous 
measures, often pertaining to different regulatory frameworks (West, 2000). Employment, 
immigration, health and security measures, and criminal justice sanctions can have such 
profound impacts on the governance of commercial sex ‘on the ground’ that they may alter, 
sometimes almost completely, the ways in which this is meant to be regulated ‘in the books’ 
by national prostitution laws. Moreover, as forms of commercial sex have become more 
diverse and multiform in recent decades, Jane Scoular and Teela Sanders (2010, p. 3) note 
that so too have their associated modes of regulation which are now “more complex than 
simply a case of sexual commerce being either legal or illegal”. Thus, we are reminded by a 
growing body of scholarship that when looking at the increasingly composite and dynamic 
ways in which prostitution is approached in any one country, a wide and multi-scalar 
examination of laws, policies, administrative sanctions and their application in practice is 
needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the intended and unintended effects of 
prostitution governance (Crowhurst, 2012; Dewey & Kelly, 2011; Jahnsen & Wagenaar, 
2018; Phoenix, 2009; Scoular & Sanders, 2010; Skilbrei & Holmstrom, 2012; Weitzer, 2012; 
West, 2000).  
In line with this suggested approach, this article seeks to attend to the understudied 
and undertheorized nexus between taxation and prostitution and its governance. It sheds light 
on the role that fiscal policies play in shaping the relationship between the state and sex 
workers and it highlights the importance of looking at tax policy to understand how 
inequality is enforced and reinforced against sexually marginalized populations. More 
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specifically, drawing on the Italian case, it explores the ways in which ambiguous taxation 
arrangements operate to penalize sex workers, excluding them from the status of full taxpayer 
citizenship, and demonizing them as individuals who exploit the fiscal system at the expense 
of ‘good’ tax-paying citizens. Disjuctures between legal and fiscal systems and conflicting 
positions between elected officials, state agencies and the public about taxation policy and its 
implementation impact the citizenship status of sex workers in ways that go against courts’ 
rulings establising that prostitution should be treated as a legitimate economic activity. Fiscal 
policies and their practical arragements, I argue, need to be considered in the context of the 
governance of prostitution as social mechanisms that may have the potential to contribute to 
the sexual and economic citizenship of this marginalized population, but which, when 
unequal and ambiguous, reinforce the social and political liminality of sex workers as lesser 
citizens, and add to the stigma, damaging stereotypes and violence already waged against 
them. The complex ways in which inequality against sex workers is maintained is a dynamic 
process that reflects the ever-shifting interplay of economics and morality. 
The exploration of these issues is structured as follows: after briefly presenting the 
source material that forms the basis of the analysis of this article, I trace an overview of the 
body of work that has looked at the significance of taxation as a marker of social and civic 
inclusion and exclusion. This is followed by a review of the limited literature that has 
addressed the nexus between taxation and prostitution. The article then proceeds to present 
and make sense of the intricacies of the Italian case, the ambiguities surrounding the fiscal 
treatment of commercial sex, and how this negatively impacts sex workers in the country. 
The discussion of these dynamics and their significance leads to concluding reflections on 
their implications for understanding more broadly the role of fiscal policies in the governance 
of prostitution. 
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Source material 
 
The article is based on analysis of a variety of documentary data. These include Italian 
statutory laws on fiscal arrangements and on prostitution, and judicial rulings issued by 
Provincial and Regional Tributary Tribunals and the Supreme Court of Appeals over the past 
three decades on aspects pertaining to the taxation of prostitution. Material was collected 
through internet searches and snowballing from the sources identified. Documentation portals 
powered by the Ministry of Economy and Finances (The Portal of Tributary Justice, 
https://www.giustiziatributaria.gov.it) and the Department of Finances (Financial and 
Economic Documentation, http://def.finanze.it/), as well as online databases of judicial 
decisions sourced from Italian Tributary Courts (eg DeJure, https://www.iusexplorer.it, and 
Iltributario, http://iltributario.it) were searched to retrieve as many rulings as possible on 
cases addressing the taxation of prostitution. Due to coverage limitations of these portals (for 
example, they do not include rulings issued by Provicial Tributary Tribunals, and only 
include a selection of Regional Tributary Tribunals documentations, mostly issued after 
2015) it was not possible to retrive all relevant rulings issued in the past three decades. 
Relevant documents were also found through other online sources, including: tax lawyers’ 
wesbites (amongst others, see Di Gennaro 2010; Prostituzione e Tasse 2010, Studio Cerbone 
e Associati 2018), jurisprudential commentaries (Capolupo, Compagnone, Vinciguerra & 
Borrelli, 2014; D’Agata, 2006; Il Foro Italiano, 1987) and in local media outlets (amongst 
others, see Falcone, 2017 and Formica, 2015). A total of 28 rulings issued between 1986 and 
2017 by Provincial and Regional Courts and the Soupreme Court of Appeal were found and 
analysed, some of which look at the same case, appealed and addressed at a higher court 
level. Based on the documentation available, it is not possible to ascertain how many sex 
workers appealed the outcomes of the Revenue Agency’s audits. Similarly, it should be noted 
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that the Revenue Agency does not provide data on the numbers, nature and outcome of fiscal 
checks it carries out. It is therefore not possible to appraise how many sex workers have been 
audited by the Revenue Agency and how many of them reached a settlement with the 
Agency. We know from Pia Covre, a former sex worker and co-founder of the Committee for 
the Civil Rights of Prostitutes (The Committee hereafter), that fiscal audits of sex workers’ 
bank accounts are many more than those that are publicly reported, because many sex 
workers prefer to settle and pay the fines without appealing (Crisafi, 2018).  
Documents publicly available on the website of the Committee (www.lucciole.org) 
also form part of the data collected, including emails exchanged by sex workers on the 
Committee’s members-only email list and later published, with the senders’ permission, on 
the Committee’s website. Email exchanged on the email list that are quoted verbatim in this 
article are exclusively the ones that received authorization from their senders to be made 
publicly available on the Committee’s website. My membership of the Committee’s 
members-only email list since the early 2000s has enabled me to follow discussions on the 
issue of taxation compliance shared with members of this platform beyond the emails made 
publicly available. The content of these conversations is mentioned, but not directly 
reproduced in this article. Other data collected and analyzed consists of television programs 
broadcast on mainstream channels focused on the taxation of prostitution, as well as news 
reporting and comments posted on media outlets.1  
 
Literature review: Taxation, citizenship and prostitution 
 
                                                 
1
 A more in-depth exploration of how prostitution taxation arrangements and their socio-cultural implications 
are understood, negotiated and responded to by sex workers themselves forms part of the ongoing project: 
‘Comparing the taxation of prostitution in Europe: experiences and negotiations with laws and fiscal 
arrangements’, funded by the Independent Social Research Foundation (2018-19). 
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Whilst their role in the organization of society is often overlookd, taxes are a political tool 
which reflect and reproduce “the ever-changing structures of social, economic, and political 
life” (Henricks & Seamster, 2017, p. 169). Far from being innocuous bureaucratic 
procedures, taxation arrangements have been central markers of civic belonging across time 
and place, and taxation policy is one of the overt measures that governments can employ to 
impinge directly on the enjoyment of citizenship privileges (Martin, Mehrotra & Prasad, 
2009; Turner, 2001). Taxpayer status is an identity that tends to elevate those who uphold it 
to a higher position with respect to demanding citizenship rights (Ventry, 2000; Walsh, 
2017). In the US, for example, taxpaying is often “seen as evidence of one’s worthiness for 
citizenship”, as well as an act of civic commitment and a moral obligation (Williamson, 
2017, p.2). In this context, those who cannot claim taxpayer status may be excluded and 
shamed as “parasitic dependents who place economic burdens on the state” (Henricks & 
Seamster, 2017, p.172). The concept of taxpayer citizenship is thus used to draw attention to 
the complex practices that not only differentiate but also create social antagonisms between 
those who enjoy political legitimacy through their taxpayer status and those who are unable 
to contribute to direct taxpaying and, for this reason, are treated as if they have no earned 
rights (Hackell, 2013; Walsh, 2017). Paying taxes, however, does not necessarily lead to and 
entail full and equal membership of a community and ‘worthy citizenship’. As Abreu (2009) 
notes, taxes can empower individuals, but this usually applies just to some individuals – those 
who are already socially and economically privileged. Moreover, fiscal policies may benefit 
some taxpayers whilst penalizing others (Infanti & Crawford, 2009; Mumford, 2010). The 
normative values underpinning taxation, in other words, reflect the most fundamental 
arrangements in society wherein groups of people are not similarly situated and equally 
treated.  
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The workings of this unevenness have been the subject of the burgeoning fields of 
fiscal sociology and critical tax theory. Both have drawn attention to the fact that taxes are 
necessary to provide essential “resources for some of the most important functions that states 
provide” (Mumford, 2010, p. 1), but are nevertheless social mechanisms and instruments of 
social control that operate within, sustain, reinforce and formalize societal inequalities 
(Blumberg, 2009; Henricks & Seamster, 2017). At the core of this critical scholarship is the 
analysis of the ways in which categorical inequalities of gender, race, sexuality and class are 
structured in taxation arrangements. For example, women, gay, lesbian and transgender 
individuals, non ‘traditional’ families, and ethnic and racial minorities are disadvantaged in 
multiple ways by tax arrangments, and this may lead to the exacerbation of their 
marginalization, inequality and poverty (Henricks & Seamster, 2017; Infanti & Crawford, 
2009; Martin & Prasad, 2014; Martin et al., 2009; Mumford, 2010; Sheffrin, 2013; Walsh, 
2018).  
The study of how the, often invisible (Abreu 2009), disproportionate taxation of 
subordinated groups contributes to their continued subordination is an aspect that is of 
relevance to the analysis of this paper. For example in relation to the fines that sex workers 
are required to pay in Italy for failing to comply with tax liabilities, when it is not clear how 
they should file tax returns in the first place. Related to this is the lack of recognition of the 
social and economic identity to which many (subordinated) individuals belong and the 
nagative impact this has on the payment of taxes and related benefits that this should entail. 
This is the case, for example, for same-sex couples and those in non-traditional families and 
relationships “who are the object of both overt and covert discrimination in the application of 
the tax laws” (Infanti & Crawford, 2009, p. 183), and undocumented migrants who, in the the 
US for instance, each year “add billions of dollars in sales, excise, property, income, and 
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payroll taxes, [yet they are] barred from almost all government benefits” (Lipman, 2006, p. 5-
6), and, caught in a similar predicament, sex workers. 
Interestingly, despite focussing on “what impact tax laws have on historically 
disempowered groups” (Infanti & Crawford, 2009, p. xxi) both critical tax theory and fiscal 
sociology have neglected to look at the taxation arrangements directed at the often 
disempowered groups who operate in the sex industry. It is not within the scope of this article 
to explore this omission in any detail. It is nevertheless worth noting that the study of 
commercial sex still rarely figures in literatures addressing economic activities, including 
employment, poverty, precariety, and, as seen here, taxation studies. This may be the case, as 
Diane Richardson notes, because both “economic analyses and sexuality studies often ignore 
the question of the relationship between sexuality and economic life” (Richardson, 2018, 
p.144). While the socio-economic forces and subjective experiences that shape the multi-
dimensional citizenship (Halsaa, Roseneil and Sumer, 2012), or lack thereof, of lesbians and 
gay men have received increasingly more scholarly attention, the intersection of sex, money 
and labor, and all the complexities that this entails for sex workers, including their exclusions 
from sexual and economic citizenship, remain under-explored. 
In the limited body of work that has considered the taxation of prostitution, the 
reproduction of social norms and biases vis-à-vis commercial sex by and within fiscal 
systems is only partially explored. Instead, one of the main issues that has been addressed 
with respect to the taxation of prostitution pertains to the discomfort governments experience 
when facing the fact that they extract revenues from what is mostly viewed as a problematic 
activity. As O’Connell Davidson (1998, p. 193) explains, “governments are rarely willing to 
acknowledge that they profit from the taxation of prostitution and/or from the fines levied 
upon sex workers and their clients.” This reticence is partly due to the fact that prostitution is 
generally viewed by the state and the public as a social and/or moral problem rather than a 
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legitimate and accepted/acceptable economic activity. Fiscal scholars explain that taxes 
levied from activities that are socially condemned, such as prostitution, gambling, or the 
consumption of alcohol and tobacco, are deemed ‘ill-gotten gains’ and can themselves 
become stigmatized – indeed they are often referred to as ‘sin taxes’ (Carruthers, 2015-16; 
Lorenzi, 2004). This attribution has not halted the levying of such taxes, attracting 
controversy over the fraught question of whether a state should extract revenues from what 
are viewed as the less than socially desirable behaviors and activities of its citizens. It should 
be noted however that nowadays “the public and policy makers have managed to arrive at a 
pragmatic consensus” over activities such as gambling (Wagenaar & Altink, 2012, p. 281) 
and the benefits of their taxation (Brents, Jackson & Hausbeck, 2010; Paton, Siegel & 
Williams, 2004). This is especially the case when ‘sin taxes’ are justified as a way of 
discouraging problematic activities, or when they are earmarked to be used to fund public 
expenditures, thus ultimately contributing to the common good (Carruthers, 2015-16; 
Lorenzi, 2004). 
 In contrast to this growing pragmatic consensus over the taxability of various socially 
problematic activities, the taxation of prostitution remains highly contested and thus more 
politically problematic for governments to tackle. Prostitution, as Wagenaar and Altink 
(2012) point out, is a particularly complex case of morality politics over which deep public 
and political conflicts persist, often articulated around diverse and clashing positions, 
including whether the activity should be taxed and how. For those who view the selling of 
sexual services as a form of labor, when it comes to taxation, “[n]o special taxes should be 
levied on prostitutes or prostitute business. Prostitutes should pay regular taxes on the same 
basis as other independent contractors and employees and should receive the same benefits” 
(from the 1985 World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights, as reproduced in Scoular, 2015, p. 92). 
Taking a different approach are those who consider prostitution to be a form of violence 
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against women and therefore liken states that tax it to pimps who capitalize on the 
exploitation of women (Barry, 1996; Cheney, 1988). From yet another perspective, 
prostitution is a social problem in need of containment and special policy measures, hence 
prostitution-related occupations should be subjected to higher taxation and levels of 
institutional regulation than other forms of labor (Phoenix, 2009). Socio-economic arguments 
about sex work as labor thus conflict with positions condemning prostitution as a form of 
violence and with others which aim at containing it as a social problem. Each of these 
positions have different implications for how the revenues of prostitution may be approached 
by the state, whether and how they should be taxed, and what social security benefits 
taxpaying sex workers should receive. In light of this complexity of views, it is often the case 
that a clear position on the taxation of prostitution is avoided in statutory laws and fiscal 
rules, with sex workers having to pay taxes without recognition of their activity as legitimate 
and falling significantly short of the ‘full membership’ ascribed to other taxpayers.  
 Susan Edwards, for example, presents the paradox whereby “earnings from 
prostitution are taxable but the British government will not condone prostitution as a lawful 
trade for the purpose of registration” (Edwards, 1997, p. 77). In Austria, Birgit Sauer (2004) 
explains that when in 1985 a new law came into force levying taxes on prostitution, sex 
workers were not granted access to the state social security, nor were they eligible for a 
business licence or for many of the benefits granted to taxpayers within other forms of labor. 
It was only in 1997 that Parliament rectified some, but not all, of these restrictions (see also 
Wagenaar, Amesberger & Altink, 2017). In the Netherlands, since the ban on brothels was 
lifted in 2000, “there has been major confusion about working relationships in brothels and 
tax rules” (Pitcher & Weijers, 2014, p. 6). Moreover the Dutch tax office identification of sex 
workers as self-employed “had the unintended effect of removing the issue of working 
conditions from the political agenda” (Pitcher & Weijers, 2014, p. 7). These few examples 
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reveal some of the ambiguities in taxation arrangements and requirements in place for 
prostitution-related revenues, and the ensuing absence of full recognition and access to 
economic and social rights for sex workers.  
The case of Nevada, the only state in the USA where prostitution is legal and 
regulated (albeit under specific and restricted conditions), is also worth mentioning. Here, as 
Barb Brents and co-authors explain, neoliberal politics and the economic interests of the 
consumer and booming leisure industry have “put regulations that protect a free market ahead 
of policies that regulate moral behaviour” (Brents et al., 2010, p. 89). The dominant market 
morality and Nevada’s approach to value politics have thus enabled and supported the 
existence of the brothel industry in a country where prostitution is otherwise entirely 
criminalized (Brents et al., 2010). However, and importantly for the discussion here, brothels, 
which pay county and/or city taxes including business licensing fees, room taxes, and liquor 
taxes, do not pay state taxes and are exempt from the entertainment state tax imposed on 
other leisure businesses, and the sexual transactions that take place on the premises are not 
subject to state sales taxes (Richards 2017). Attempts to reverse this situation in 2009 through 
the imposition of a state tax on brothels were promptly halted by legislators “because they 
feared the national attention that would result from yet again appearing to legitimize 
prostitution” (Brents et al., 2010, p. 223). Similarly, as Richards (2017) notes, all sides of the 
argument agree that what is at stake here is an issue of legitimacy. As was written in the Reno 
Gazzette-Journal,  
for the brothel industry, it’s not about the money. Rather it’s about the legitimacy 
that comes with being involved in a state-recognized taxpaying business. As much as 
the state needs the additional money, Nevada cannot afford to give the brothel 
industry the legitimacy it seeks (Reno Gazzette-Journal, 2009, quoted in Richards, 
2017, p. 313) 
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The choice of words in this passage is significant. Whilst prostitution is legal in Nevada, 
within the parameters of strict but implementable regulations, the state does not wish to be 
seen as legitimizing it by taxing it, which would imply validating prostitution as an acceptable 
and mainstreamed economic activity, such as it has done with gambling. “Even the recent 
unparalleled state budget crisis, in which Nevada struggled to close a total fiscal year 2011 
budget shortfall equal to half of the state’s general fund, did not soften state legislators’ 
attitudes” (Richards 2017, p. 312). In this respect, the case of the ‘state of sex’ (Brents et al., 
2010) highlights the cultural and symbolic meaning of taxes whereby, as Carruthers’s (2015-
16) explains, fiscal imposition imparts meaning to tax revenues by attributing a social status 
to the taxed market transaction. Through its system of taxation, the state “renders the private 
economy legible, recognizes some of its moral features, and enacts with precision both 
approval and disapprobation” (Carruthers, 2015-16, p. 2579). By not imposing a state tax on 
brothels, Nevada has been avoiding assigning full recognition and social and political 
legitimation to the sex trade (despite having legalized it), thus eluding unwanted public and 
political attention to its unique situation. 
Elizabeth Remick (2003), in one of the few studies of the ways in which the 
relationship between the state and prostitution has been mediated and shaped by taxation 
arrangements, presents another example, this time a historical one, of the discomfort of 
governments with respect to taxing prostitution. In early republican China, Remick (2003) 
explains, prostitution was viewed as morally distasteful, however, its revenue-generating 
potential trumped any moral arguments at a time when local states were craving economic 
and political modernist expansion. At the turn of the twentieth century, most places chose to 
licence and tax prostitution “both as a way of controlling prostitution and as a way of 
harnessing a potential revenue stream” (Remick, 2003, p. 43). This approach was met with 
strong opposition and to overcome it government officials modified the language used to 
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identify such taxes. They started calling them ‘regulations banning prostitution’, “although 
they actually consisted of a schedule of the tax rates that brothels would be charged” (2003, 
p. 43). A change of name allowed the authorities to avoid the dishonor of prostitution-related 
‘sin taxes’ by altering their symbolic and public meaning, and thus concealed the material 
contributions of prostitution to the building of their modern local states. This historical 
example introduces the scenario whereby the economic benefits that come with the taxation 
of prostitution are exploited by a state, leading at the same time to some form of recognition 
and legitimation of commercial sex and sex workers. Whilst this legitimation was eventually 
not accomplished in Remick’s example due to widespread moral opposition, the Chinese case 
sheds light on the link between sexual politics, morality and economic life which is at the 
core of the taxation of prostitution. As Richardson emphasizes, “assumed links between 
sexuality and the economy have been a significant aspect of claims for recognition of sexual 
diversity via the argument that this is good for business and the national economy” 
(Richardson, 2018, p. 158). Nevada, Brents et al. (2010) argue, is a case in point, although it 
did not go as far as introducing state taxes on brothels, a decision which sheds light on how 
the interplay between tax policy and morality politics might ascribe or hinder sexual and 
economic citizenship. 
In sum, drawing on critical taxation studies this section started by outlining a 
framework of understanding that positions taxation as a social practice that is embedded in 
and tends to reproduce structures of inequality. It then proceeded to explore the limited 
scholarship that has considered the nexus of taxation and prostitution and its focus on the 
reluctance of states to confront this issue publicly and unambiguously. Overall, a key theme 
that emerged from this contextualization is how taxation arrangements until now have 
contributed mainly to reinforcing the outsider status and lesser citizenship of sex workers. 
Also central to the analysis presented here is the dynamic relationship between sexual and 
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economic concerns, morality and politics – an aspect that needs to be explored further with 
regard to prostitution, the taxation of which can represent a useful analytical angle to doing 
so. 
 
Prostitution must be taxed, but sex workers cannot pay taxes: The Italian case 
 
Prostitution is not illegal in Italy but the abolitionist law that regulates it, the so-called Merlin 
Law of 1958, criminalizes most prostitution-related activities including loitering, kerb-
crawling, soliciting, third parties’ involvement in the recruitment, aiding and abetting of 
prostitution, and profiting from the prostitution of others (Crowhurst, Testaì, Di 
Feliciantonio, Garofalo-Geymonat, 2017). Despite being an activity that generates revenues, 
prostitution is not recognized as a legitimate form of labor, nor is it explicitly regulated under 
civil law or under fiscal measures (Capolupo et al., 2014). Can it therefore be taxed? The 
answer to this question remains shrouded in ambiguity. The definitive 2010 court ruling 
stating that prostitution should be taxed in principle, has not been translated into practical 
fiscal arrangements. These arrangements, to this day, do not contemplate prostitution as a 
recognized economic activity, as identified in the court rulings, making it very difficult for 
sex workers to be able to fill in their tax returns, pay taxes and social security contributions as 
sex workers and claim the benfits that this should entail. In what follows I trace the evolution 
of this complex situation, starting with the most relevant jurisprudential developments on the 
matter in recent years. 
 
Prostitution must be taxed: The intricate developments of a recent judicial ruling 
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Even though it did not specifically address the taxation of prostitution, a ruling issued in 
August 1986 by the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal (ruling n.4927, August 1st 1986, section 
III civil) represented for some time a landmark decision on the matter. The case under 
scrutiny had been brought to the Provincial Court of Florence in 1982 by an actress who, 
having suffered injuries during a car accident, claimed compensation for the loss of revenues 
on her “normal activity as a prostitute”2 (Il Foro Italiano, 1987, p. 494). The court ruled 
against the woman, stating that revenues generated from prostitution could not be 
compensated because prostitution is not acknowledged and protected as a legitimate activity 
under Italian law. Some financial compensation was nevertheless granted to the woman by 
the court, calculated on the basis of the average income of a housewife – a notably inferior 
sum compared to the one the claimant had requested. The woman challenged this decision, 
but when her case reached the Supreme Court of Appeal her appeal was rejected. 
Compensation, the Supreme Court reiterated, can only be guaranteed if what has been 
damaged is a good which is guaranteed by the law. The ruling stated that  
prostitution is an activity contrary to public decency, since it is perceived by most 
people as violating common morality; based on the moral rules representing the 
patrimony of our civilization, [the idea of] a woman selling her body is […] rejected 
by common morality (D’Agata, 2006, p.89).  
Prostitution, the Supreme Court concluded, may not be a crime by law, but it is “morally 
illicit” and is therefore “absolutely irreconcilable” with self-employment or dependent 
employment (Il Foro Italiano, 1987, p. 496). Although the ruling did not address taxation 
explicitly, the pronouncement that prostitution-related income could not be treated as 
                                                 
2
 All documents originally written in Italian have been translated into English by the author. 
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legitimate revenue on moral grounds was referred to in the first court cases that started 
addressing the taxation of prostitution almost two decades later, in the early 2000s.  
Indeed, only relatively recently has the taxation of prostitution become a matter of 
legal and public debate in the country. For many years, since its foundation in 1982, the sex 
worker-run Committee for the Civil Rights of Prostitutes has been a solitary voice in its 
demands for the recognition of prostitution as labor and for the right to pay taxes on it as a 
fully recognized economic activity and to receive the social security benefits that come with 
it (Comitato, 2012; Senato della Repubblica, 2009). 
What brought public and political attention to the issue, however, was not a 
commitment by the state to take a clear position on the status of prostitution in the country, 
but rather the unplanned outcome of new fiscal controls. Following the establishment of the 
Revenue Agency and of the Customs Agency in 2001, and with a view to achieving a newly 
set plan to fight tax evasion and ensure tax compliance (OECD 2016), in the early 2000s, the 
Italian Revenue Agency started carrying out stringent fiscal checks. The economic crisis 
played a role in renewing attention to tax avoidance in the country as a measure to counter 
the financial and economic crisis (European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2012), and the 
collection of tax debt peaked in 2010 and 2011 (OECD, 2016). As a result of increased fiscal 
checks, the Revenue Agency came across a number of individuals who had accumulated 
capital and assets from their activities as sex workers without declaring them in their tax 
returns. As the court cases that followed reveal, also confirmed by emails exchanged on the 
Committee’s email list and later published on the Committee’s website (Comitato 2011, see 
also later section on this), many of the sex workers identified and penalized by the Revenue 
Agency had not declared their commercial sex-related income based on the understanding 
that prostitution is not recognized as a legitimate economic activity in Italy, and therefore it 
cannot be taxed. The Revenue Agency followed its standard procedures in cases of tax non-
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compliance, i.e. it requested that the individuals identified pay the amount of taxes that it had 
calculated, often in addition to hefty fines. The Agency operated according to the principle 
that financial movements that are not recorded on tax returns are proof of an undisclosed 
activity, and it is up to the audited individual to demonstrate that any un-recorded income 
should not be subject to taxation (a procedural approach later supported by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in rulings 9573/2007 and 18111/2009). 
When a settlement was not reached with the Revenue Agency, some sex workers 
appealed against the legality of these fines and tax bills and how they had been calculated 
and, when they were successful, the Revenue Agency appealed in return (as shown in the 
summaries of the court cases analyzed, for examples see footnote 3). Appeal after appeal, 
some of these cases very slowly moved through the Italian judicial system, from Provincial to 
Regional Tributary Courts. In 2010 one of them reached the Supreme Court of Appeal (ruling 
20528, 1st October 2010), where a decision was made in favor of the taxation of prostitution. 
Before looking at this final and definitive ruling, it is useful to review briefly the contrasting 
evaluations that were issued at the local-level courts during this first decade of legal disputes.  
Until the mid 2000s provincial and regional tributary judgements on the matter had 
mostly made reference to and followed the 1986 ruling mentioned earlier. In other words, 
they excluded the possibility that prostitution-related income should be taxed due to its 
immoral nature3. In ruling XLVII, for example, the Tributary Commission of Milan 
established that until the law intervenes to clearly regulate the ‘selling of one’s self’, proceeds 
from prostitution cannot be counted as ‘income’, but rather as compensation for the damage it 
causes to human dignity, and therefore cannot be taxed (D’Agata, 2006).  
                                                 
3
 For example, ruling XXX of the Tributary Commission of Sondrio 22nd September 2004, ruling 272 of the 
Tributary Commission of Milan Sez XLVII 22nd December 2005, and ruling 35/31/05 of the Tributary 
Commission of Lombardy 31st March 2006. 
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In the second half of the 2000s local and regional tributary tribunals’ rulings started 
taking a different approach. In 2007, for example, the Provincial Taxation Commission of 
Florence (in ruling 146, May 8th 2007) made reference to Law 537 of 1993 which had 
established that revenues generated from illicit activities should be taxed. In this court case 
the judges made reference to a provision in the civil code which prohibits the selling of body 
parts (a provision originally intended to address the commercial exploitation of body organs). 
This allowed them to establish that prostitution is an illicit activity and therefore that 
prostitution-related income should be taxed as ‘other income’. Without getting into too much 
detail, some clarifications are needed here as to how income is variously categorized in the 
Italian tax system. In Italy taxes are levied on income generated from: subordinate 
employment; self-employment (i.e. autonomous employment carried out on a regular basis); 
capitals; properties; commercial activities; and on what is classified as ‘other income’, i.e. a 
broad category that includes occasional subordinate employment, occasional self-
employment, and importantly here, illicit gains. The 2007 ruling of the Florence Provincial 
Taxation Commission identified prostitution as an illicit activity whose revenues should fall 
under ‘other income’ and therefore be subject to taxation. Contrastingly, in 2009 the 
Tributary Tribunal of Reggio Emilia (ruling 131, 11th June 2009) established that when 
prostitution is carried out as a habitual profession and when this is done autonomously and 
freely, as in the case of the woman who appealed against the Revenue Agency in the case 
under review, the financial income deriving from it should be classified and taxed as the 
income of self-employed professionals. Importantly, in contrast with what had been 
deliberated in 2007 by the Florence Taxation Commission, this ruling and similar others 
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issued after 20094, detached prostitution from the sphere of the illicit and categorized it as a 
form of self-employment. 
The lack of consistency in these decisions and the confusion they generated had 
already been noted by the Committee which in 2007 issued a press release stating:  
ever more frequent are cases of sex workers asked by the Revenue Agency to pay 
taxes on their income. […] Many [sex workers] ask us what they should be doing, 
naturally they should appeal because it is not clear whether sex workers, who are not 
legally recognised as workers, should pay [taxes] or not. (Comitato, 2018) 
In an attempt to resolve such ambiguity, in 2008 two MPs from the Radical Party submitted a 
parliamentary interrogation to the government on the matter. In it, a query was raised about 
the fact that, whilst a duty, paying taxes should also guarantee the taxpayer both protection 
and assistance, in compliance with labor rights. The Italian legislation, they claimed,  
does not regulate in any way the fiscal treatment of prostitution as this is not 
recognized as a profession. Therefore [… we] ask here if it is not opportune to ensure 
a uniform interpretation to which the Revenue Agency will have to comply on the 
fiscal treatment of the revenues of prostitution (Poretti 2008).  
The interrogation was never addressed, and the government has yet to take a position 
on the matter. It was two years later, in 2010, that some clarity on the issue was shed in a 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s definitive ruling on one of the first cases that had been brought to 
court in 2004 (ruling xxx of the Tributary Commission of Sondrio, 22nd October 2004), and 
which had since gone through a series of appeals. In it, the Supreme Court stated that “even if 
the activity of prostitution is debatable on moral grounds, it certainly cannot be viewed as 
illicit”, and therefore it should be subject to taxation (no. 20528, October 1st 2010). A few 
                                                 
4
 For example rulings: 109/10/2010 of the Tributary Commission of Rome 25th March 2010 and 82/04/10 of the 
Tributary Commission of Ravella  30th April 2010. 
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months later, another ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeal (no. 10578, 13th May 2011) 
further specified that even if prostitution is against common morals and it transgresses 
“shared ethical norms that normally reject the commerce of one’s own body for money, the 
activity here described is not a crime” and consists rather of services provided in return for 
remuneration. As such, when it is performed regularly and autonomously, prostitution should 
not only be subject to income tax, but also to VAT. As the Tributary Commission of Savona 
(ruling 389/01/2016, 21st June 2016) stated in a ruling supporting the 2010 Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s decision, ‘pecunia non olet’ – money does not smell – i.e. the source of income 
should not matter for fiscal purposes.  
To support its decision, the Supreme Court referred to a ruling of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) (n.268, 20th November 2001) which, in reviewing the case of the 
Netherlands, had stated that the activity of prostitution when pursued in a self-employed 
capacity can be regarded as a service provided for remuneration and should therefore be 
subject to VAT. This ruling was specific to the Netherlands where prostitution is regulated 
and explicitly treated as an economic activity, including for fiscal purposes. This legal and 
fiscal context is notably different from the Italian one, hence the problematic applicability of 
this Supreme Court ruling, as further discussed in the next section. Also worth noting is that 
this same ECJ ruling had been referred to, but challenged by the Tributary Commission of 
Milan in the 2005 ruling mentioned earlier (XLVII, 22nd December 2005) because, the Milan 
Commission had stated, the conclusion reached by the ECJ is contrary to Italian law’s 
commitment to guaranteeing human dignity (D’Agata 2006).  
 
Sex workers cannot pay taxes: The problematic application of the law ‘on the ground’   
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Apart from issuing hefty fines to sex workers and demanding that they pay taxes on the 
income calculated by the Revenue Agency, the application of the 2010 Supreme Court 
decision has not been followed through in the practical arrangements of tax returns 
procedures. As a result, sex workers find themselves in a situation where they are told that 
they must pay taxes, but they face a number of institutional obstacles which make it very 
difficult to practically do so. “If escorts wish to file tax returns”, explains Pia Covre, “the 
Italian Revenue Agency forbids it to them because there are no rules that allow them to” 
(Crisalfi, 2018). To understand why this is the case, a brief overview of the ways in which the 
tax return system operates in Italy is herewith outlined.  
Self-employed workers who carry out regular professional services must register with 
the Italian Revenue Agency and obtain an individual registration number to be able to fill in 
and submit their yearly tax return forms. Since the 1st January 2008, in order to register with 
the Revenue Agency and fill in their tax return forms at the end of the fiscal year, self-
employed taxpayers are required to specify to the Revenue Agency the economic activity 
they carry out. In order to do so, they must select from a long list of activities provided by the 
Italian Statistics Office, each of which is attached to a code, the so-called ATECO code, that 
needs to be indicated on the tax return form. The Revenue Agency states that: 
 the classification of economic activities represents an indispensable instrument to 
understand and therefore manage the world of business [in the country]. It is only by 
defining with precision the typologies of activities carried out [by those submitting 
tax returns] that it is possible to understand their economic behaviours and their fiscal 
requirements. Being able to classify one’s activity correctly is therefore of mutual 
benefit both to the contributors who will see their specific activities recognized, and 
for the administration which will be able to manage better their fiscal needs by taking 
into account this specificity (Agenzia delle Entrate, 2017, emphasis added).  
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Emphasis is placed here on the Revenue Agency’s explanation of the importance of the fiscal 
classification system on tax return forms, because one of the obstacles that sex workers still 
face is the lack of a specific ATECO code for the activity of commercial sex. This makes it 
impossible for them to comply with the requirement to clearly and accurately identify such a 
code in their tax returns, and therefore for the Revenue Agency to recognize and better 
manage their specific activity.  
The situation for sex workers who, on one hand, are told they have to pay taxes and 
are fined if they do not do so, whilst, on the other, having to navigate a system which is not 
prepared to recognize them as self-employed taxpayers, has been revealed in two secretly 
filmed videos produced and broadcast by two popular Italian television programmes in 2013 
and 2016. Both videos show the conflicting, uncertain and often inaccurate responses given 
to individuals who asked to submit their tax returns as sex workers at their local Revenue 
Agency offices (La7, 2016; Le Iene, 2013). Feedback given out to these enquiries by 
Revenue Agency employees varies from suggesting the continuation of ‘working in black’, to 
double checking with an accountant and a solicitor whether prostitution is actually legal and 
taxable in Italy, to using alternative ATECO codes even if they are not accurate. As a 
despondent Revenue Agency employee stated in one of the videos: “we run after those who 
don’t pay taxes, but we abandon those who want to pay them. It’s a manifestation of the 
Italian spirit which never deals with problems and is therefore unable to find solutions” (La7, 
2016). What is striking about this statement is that, in the ‘Kafkaesque’ situation in which 
they are caught, as the same Revenue Agency employee characterizes it, sex workers are both 
‘run after’ and abandoned by the state.  
Between 2011 and 2013 analogous encounters were shared on the Committee’s 
email list. Some sex workers reported that their queries with the Revenue Agency about 
registering to pay taxes had been met with a lack of knowledge as to what procedure to 
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follow, or with the advice of doing nothing and hoping not to be found in the case of fiscal 
checks, or to use alternative ATECO codes which are inaccurate. Those who had consulted 
accountants or lawyers explained that they received conflicting advice and were even more 
confused about what to do. In a 2014 article, the British newspaper The Guardian covered the 
paradoxical predicament faced by sex workers in Italy citing the story of two sex workers 
with similar experiences to those described above. Carol “said she had been treated like an 
‘extraterrestrial’ and sent packing when she offered to pay taxes at her local tax office only to 
receive a bill for €70,000, based on a year's earnings” (Kington, 2014), and Sandra Yara “said 
she had been surprised to receive a bill for €50,000 after being told by her local chamber of 
commerce that her work could not be categorised” (Kington, 2014). 
Online commentaries written by tax accountants on this issue claim that there are 
ways in which sex workers can pay taxes. Many suggest that they should use the ATECO 
code ‘Other activities related to the provision of services to other people and which are not 
possible to classify’ (see for example, La Legge Per Tutti, 2017; Prostituzione Tasse, 2016). 
The ATECO description of this code includes astrologists and psychics, genealogical 
research, shoe-shiners, parking attendants, management of various slot machines, lifeguards, 
domestic services carried out by self-employed people (e.g. cleaning, cooking, etc.) – 
activities that are clearly very different from the provision of sexual services. While using a 
generic code is indeed possible if necessary5, there are further procedural difficulties related 
to, for example, what economic activity should be specified in the compulsory registration 
with the National Institute of Social Insurance, or the lack, to this day, of the average income 
of a sex worker calculated by the Revenue Agency and upon which regular fiscal checks are 
                                                 
5
 As clarified in an email exchange (19th April 2018) with an Italian fiscal accountant, the ATECO code used in 
tax returns should be as precise as possible. However, when an activity cannot be clearly categorized under an 
existing code, it is indeed possible to utilize a generic code. In the end, the accountant stated, it should always be 
possible to find a code. 
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based, or as seen, the reluctance by Revenue Agency employees to allow sex workers to 
register with them, even with a generic code. Worth mentioning also is the refusal of tax 
lawyers to help sex workers with tax returns (as noted in the Committee’s email list 
exchanges), also openly admitted to by a lawyer representing a sex worker on an appeal case: 
“if an escort asked me to register with the Revenue Agency and file tax returns, I would reply 
that I am not in the condition to help her [sic]” (Formica, 2015). There is also lack of clarity 
on what might be counted as allowable expenses when filing tax returns and whether 
accountants would feel competent enough to ascertain this without incurring penalizing 
mistakes for their clients (an issue raised by a lawyer representing a sex worker who appealed 
to the Revenue Agency, see Radio Radicale, 2008). But the problem with using a generic 
code is also related to the lack of recognition it entails for sex workers. If all procedural 
obstacles were overcome sex workers could perhaps manage to pay taxes, but prostitution 
would still not be treated as an economic activity equal to others, given the many limitations 
that the current prostitution law imposes on sex workers, including not being able to advertise 
their services nor to work in the same premises with other co-workers. 
The fundamental faults of the system have deeply negative effects on the lives of 
sex workers, as revealed in the emails exchanged on the Committee’s list. Sex workers 
explain that they find themselves in a frustrating and distressing situation for which they 
see no viable solution, nor any interest from the government in unambiguously 
addressing it. They feel hopeless, fear losing their earnings and lament being treated like 
criminals whose rights as citizens are ignored by the state. Other emails exchanged on 
this same list and published on the Committee’s website further emphasize the lack of 
understanding of the legal status of sex workers and the apprehension this causes: 
I am very worried about the strict fiscal controls, also because our positions as 
prostitutes is not clear at all. But what should we do? We cannot fill in our tax return 
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forms and as far as I know it is not possible to tax prostitution-related income 
because the Merlin Law [the 1958 prostitution law] is still in place. I am fearful […] 
I am terrified, also because people talk about sending tax evaders to prison and I 
have no idea of what to do (Comitato, 2011). 
I think that what holds more value is the law of the State [the 1958 prostitution law], 
which is there […] and defends us from pimps, including the Fiscal-pimp. Can the 
Supreme Court of Appeal change, ignore, brush off the laws of the State!? 
(Comitato, 2011) 
Here sex workers make reference to the 1958 national law on prostitution which they have 
come to know well, with its many restrictions and the limited protections it offers. This law 
forbids profiting from the prostitution of others, and sex workers believe it should also 
protect them from the state (the ‘fiscal-pimp’) profiting from the taxation of their revenues. 
The judiciary, they claim, should not be able to ‘brush off’ what the law states. Underpinning 
these comments is a deep-seated sense of uncertainty as to who is going to uphold the law 
when state agencies themselves are disregarding it. What are we to make of courts’ rulings 
which nobody knows how to implement? As discussed above, Revenue Agency employees 
are not even clear about what the law on prostitution is and whether it is a crime or not, nor 
do they appear to have been informed about the Supreme Court’s decisions and how to 
execute them. This status of ambiguity keeps many sex workers in what is experienced as a 
trap and an inescapable and vulnerable state of social liminality wherein they are only 
acknowledged, and punished, as criminals.  
Contributing further to such marginalization is widespread ignorance of the intricacies 
of the paradoxical situation faced by sex workers. A diffused belief is that sex workers are in 
a fiscally privileged position because, unlike other citizens, they are allowed to earn and not 
pay taxes. This, for example, emerges from threatening emails received by the Committee, 
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and then discussed with its email-list members. These messages reveal the deep-seated anger 
and spite of some towards sex workers for not paying taxes and getting rich at the expense of 
the state while all other law-abiding taxpaying citizens, with honest lives and occupations, are 
struggling financially. Although not systematically reviewed, other examples of similar 
beliefs and sentiments can be found in the many comments posted online in response to 
articles in national and local news reporting on the court cases mentioned earlier. Here, 
spiteful and verbally violent claims abound about Italian sex workers having gotten away 
with not paying taxes for too long, and now finally being ‘caught’ by the state. And indeed, 
headlines of local and national newspapers such as: Rimini [city]: The Revenue Agency nails 
also a prostitute: “She has to pay taxes” (Nanni, 2017), Ferrara [city]: Prostitutes should 
pay taxes like all of us (LanuovaFerrara, 2016), Tributary justice in Savona [city]: Are you a 
prostitute? Then you have to pay taxes (SavonaNews, 2016) contribute to misrepresenting the 
predicament in which sex workers are caught by depicting them as unscrupulous tax avoiders 
finally ‘nailed’ by state interventions.  
 
Discussion: The ambiguous taxation of prostitution and its implications 
 
The developments outlined above show that a significant shift took place in courts’ rulings in 
the mid 2000s, perhaps best exemplified by the different approach taken towards the ECJ 
decision, first rejected on account of Italian human dignity standards, and then embraced to 
support the qualification of prostitution as an economic activity. When sex workers started 
appealing against the outcomes of the Revenue Agency’s audits and their cases reached the 
Provincial Tributary Courts in 2004 and 2005, deliberations on such cases had been 
unprecedented. The decisions taken to treat prostitution as an un-taxable immoral activity and 
its proceeds as compensation for damage rather than compensation for services reflected the 
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decades-long tendency (since the passing of the 1958 prostitution law) in the country to 
ignore prostitution as an economic activity and to rather treat it as public indecency contrary 
to national morality. The opposite rulings that started being issued by the courts in 2007 
reflect the more stringent application of new fiscal measures put in place in the 2000s, and a 
‘pragmatic’ stance whereby prostitution, albeit still identified as morally dubious, is also 
clearly identified as an economic activity. Pressure to ensure tax compliance in the context of 
the unfolding economic crisis might have played a role in the tributary judges’ decision to 
supplant the ‘moral argument’ and come to the financially favorable conclusion that ‘money 
does not smell’.  
What needs to be considered, however, is whether the change of discourse in the 
courts’ ruling has contributed to, or at least facilitated claims for the recognition of sex 
workers’ rights as workers, and an improved sexual citizenship status. According to Formica 
(2015) “after decades of failed battles fought by politicians and pressure groups, finally it is 
the atavistic hunger of the Revenue Agency that might lead to a change the Merlin Law [the 
current 1958 prostitution Law] and to make prostitution a lawful job, fully recognized and 
regulated”. Such a positive view, however, has not materialised. The Supreme Court’s 
decisions were not followed through in the practical fiscal arrangements of the Revenue 
Agency, thus leading to a disjuncture between rules ‘in the books’, in this case court rulings, 
and their actual application. This resulted in further uncertainty as to whether or how 
prostitution-related revenues should be taxed in practice. Such a landscape of ambiguity has 
profound material consequences for sex workers who face the constant threat of losing their 
earnings, uncertainty about their future, and further social stigma for being identified as tax 
evaders. As Covre explains, “these are not rulings that grant rights, they only grant the duty 
to pay taxes […], we need a law that recognised our job with related social benefits, only in 
that scenario it is right for us to pay taxes” (Crisafi, 2018). Ultimately, due to the obstacles 
 28 
they face in actually filing tax returns, and in light of the the 2010 Supreme Court rulings, sex 
workers find themselves in a situation whereby they are acknowledged by the state and 
pursued as tax non-compliant, and for this they are punished with hefty fines. At the very 
same time they are ignored by the state as citizens who want to pay taxes as sex workers, and 
are thus denied the rights and protection that taxpayer citizenship and full recognition of their 
activity should entail. A possible solution to avoid this situation and remain law abiding is to 
become invisible as sex workers, and file tax returns by selecting a different activity. 
In discussing the social and political relevance of taxation, Martin et al. (2009, p. 3) 
claim that “paying taxes is one thing that everyone has to do, whether they are consumers, 
homeowners, wage earners, or investors. This generality makes taxation a crucial element in 
the development of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the modern nation-state”. 
By effectively denying sex workers the right to pay taxes, the system in place reinforces their 
historical exclusion from the ‘imagined community’ of the nation-state. This systemic 
exclusion from taxpaying and from the recognition and rights that this should entail, is 
compounded by the limited, and often conflicting, knowledge about the ambiguity 
surrounding the taxation of prostitution in the country and the damaging and vulnerable 
position into which sex workers are forced as a result. Even when the issue has been raised 
and debated publicly, the narrative of sex workers as unscrupulous tax evaders continues to 
dominate. In a country where the debate on taxation and its distribution stirs sanguine 
discussions and strong resentments against tax evaders (Guano, 2010), sex workers have 
become an easy target for frustrated citizens who, ignoring the predicament in which sex 
workers are caught, blame them for their woes and for the country’s troubled public finances 
fuelling already strong anti-sex worker resentment and aversion. As Teela Sanders (2016) 
argues, the status that sex workers are given in society is shaped by broader structural and 
cultural factors which often contribute to violence against sex workers: social status and 
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stigma have “significant effects on social attitude towards sex workers and how they are 
treated” (2016, p. 104). Thus, public and official discourses and practices which “position sex 
workers as non-citizens, as rubbish, not to be cared about” ‘other’ them as separate from 
‘normal’ individuals, reinforcing “ideas which perpetuate associations with criminogenic 
offenders, immoral and dangerous sexuality, disease, incivility, and disgust” (Sanders, 2016, 
p. 104). These processes can be observed in Italy, where the maintenance of the ambiguous 
taxation of prostitution contributes to reproducing damaging stereotypes about sex workers, 
associating them with criminality and social deviance, and reinforcing both their social and 
systemic exclusions. 
Giuliana Zincone explains that in Italy “laws can easily be trespassed since they tend 
to be vague and contradictory” (1998, p. 76) – this facilitates the flourishing of a messy 
patchwork of policies and of inconsistency between proclaimed principles embodied in 
legislation and their actual, often discretionary and arbitrary, implementation. This 
“propensity for ‘self-contradiction’”, Zincone also argues (1998, p. 45), is part of a structural 
ambiguity which is particularly convenient where ‘hot matters’ are concerned, i.e. “matters 
that cannot ignore opposition views” (Zincone, 1998, p. 45). This is an important point to 
consider in making sense of the broader structural context of the specific Italian case. The 
inconsistences and contradictions that compound the ambiguous treatment of the taxation of 
prostitution in Italy are partly an outcome of a structurally dysfunctional relationship between 
state institutions, and specifically, in this case, fiscal instruments and legal frameworks, and 
between what they state on paper and how they are implemented in practice. We saw that in 
2008 some politicians asked the government to intervene and bring some clarity to the issue. 
No government has since done so, as this is likely a matter too ‘politically hot’ for 
unambiguous consideration. As discussed earlier with respect to the contemporary example 
of Nevada and the historical one of China, fiscal impositions are not neutral but give social 
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status to the market transactions they tax. “Governments cannot tax an activity and claim an 
indifference towards the occurrence of the taxed behaviour. They can’t avoid moral 
judgements in taxation” (Lorenzi, 2004, p. 64). Changing the legal status of prostitution in 
Italy has so far proven too politically contentious to result in any more than inconclusive and 
‘never ending debates’ (Danna, 2004). As a result, an ambiguous state of affairs remains in 
spite of the courts’ rulings that prostitution should be treated as a legitimate economic 
activity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This contribution started from the premise, already brought forward in much research on the 
governance of prostitution, that in order to understand the complex factors that shape the 
relationship between the state and sex workers in any one country it is essential to move 
beyond a narrow focus on prostitution laws and policies in order to explore a much broader 
variety of regulatory frameworks, measures and practices. The article showed that, albeit still 
under-researched and often overlooked, the fiscal treatment of prostitution is an important 
dimension to consider given its role in the formalization and legitimation of the exchange of 
sexual services, or indeed its opposite, the exclusion of sex workers from the equal treatment 
and recognition of their activities. Taxes are social mechanisms that reflect political interests 
and broader social inequalities, and it should come as no surprise that in a field of moral 
politics such as prostitution the taxation of commercial sex-related revenues represents a 
highly contentious issue, one that governments try to avoid confronting. 
A final point worth reciting pertains to the possibilities that the taxation of prostitution 
might offer. In an article on a rather different topic, Michael Ross (2004) asks if their need 
for greater tax revenue force authoritarian governments to democratize. Along these lines, in 
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the context of shifting global economic (mis)fortunes, we may ask if the enhanced economic 
need for taxation offers opportunities for sex workers to claim a right to taxation with 
representation and recognition. It remains to be seen if, as has been pointed out by 
scholarship engaging with the intersection of sexuality and the economy (Brents 2016; 
Grzanka, Mann and Elliott 2016; Richardson 2018), the neoliberal marketization of political 
issues, sexuality and sexual practices will advance in any ways sex workers’ rights, or 
whether, perhaps more likely, it will ignore their demands for full sexual citizenship. The 
interplay of economics and morality is a dynamic and ever-shifting process which might offer 
opportunities but it might also reinforce obstacles to advancing sex workers’s rights. 
 Closer attention to these issues by critical tax theory, fiscal sociology and sex work 
and prostitution studies has the potential to shed light on the under-explored interconnection 
between economic politics and sex work, and specifically on how taxation can be implicated 
in the reproduction of violence and exclusion against sex workers or, possibly, also in sex 
workers’ improved recognition and rights, and if so, under what socio-economic conditions.  
 
 
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee 
and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 
standards. 
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